Faculty Retirement Policies after the End of Mandatory Retirement by Ehrenberg, Ronald G & Rizzo, Michael J
Cornell University ILR School
DigitalCommons@ILR
Articles and Chapters ILR Collection
10-2001
Faculty Retirement Policies after the End of
Mandatory Retirement
Ronald G. Ehrenberg
Cornell University, rge2@cornell.edu
Michael J. Rizzo
Cornell University
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles
Part of the Education Economics Commons, Higher Education Commons, Human Resources
Management Commons, Labor Economics Commons, and the Labor Relations Commons
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR.
Support this valuable resource today!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles
and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact hlmdigital@cornell.edu.
Faculty Retirement Policies after the End of Mandatory Retirement
Abstract
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some states, rapidly growing college age cohorts will require academic institutions to hire large numbers of
new faculty in the years ahead to fill positions created to meet the expanding demand for enrollments.
Nationally, institutions will have to replace a large number of retiring faculty members in the years ahead. This
suggests that most institutions’ concern in upcoming years will not be how to encourage their faculty
members to retire. Rather, their concern will be how to continue to draw on the skills of faculty nearing
retirement ages to provide stability to their institutions during a time of rapid change.
In the years ahead, it is likely that more and more institutions will consider developing programs to permit
phased retirements, or to encourage retired faculty to teach part-time, as a way of meeting their teaching
needs. Similarly, faculty groups at institutions may well want to contrast the regular retirement programs,
retirement incentive programs, and programs relating to emeritus faculty that their institutions offer with the
programs that we indicate are being offered at other institutions and use this information in discussion with
their administrations.
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As the average age of faculty members at colleges and universities 
in the United States continues to increase, retirement policies and
programs in higher education are playing an increasingly important
role in maintaining and enhancing the productivity of faculty members
of all ages. This issue of Research Dialogue summarizes the results of a
2000 survey of higher education institutions regarding their programs
and policies that affect faculty retirement. In addition to analyzing
survey data regarding early retirement incentive arrangements and
other programs designed to help faculty make the transition to retire-
ment, the authors also review and discuss the experiences of the
surveyed institutions following the elimination of mandatory retirement.
Faculty Retirement Policies after the End of
Mandatory Retirement
r e s e a r c h
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> > > I N T R O D U C T I O N
When the elimination of mandatory retirement for
tenured faculty members became effective in January
1994, some in the academic community feared that
voluntary faculty retirements would slow. This would
decrease opportunities for academic institutions to
make new faculty appointments and simultaneously
increase the institutions’ salary costs.
Recent studies of the experiences of Cornell, Duke, North
Carolina State and the University of North Carolina since
the end of mandatory retirement found that there has
been little effect on the probability that faculty retire
prior to age 70. However, these studies also found that
a substantial fraction of faculty members who would
have been constrained by the law to retire at age 70
now appear to be postponing their retirements until
later ages.1 In addition, a recent comprehensive faculty
retirement study undertaken at a randomly selected
sample of 104 institutions nationwide found that post-
ponement of retirement for faculty that otherwise
would have been constrained to retire at age 70 has not
been confined to major research universities.2
While some institutions are concerned about how they
should alter their retirement policies in response to the
elimination of mandatory retirement, others are more
concerned about the large fraction of their faculty nearing
retirement ages. For example, the study of 104 institu-
tions described above indicated that 14 percent of all
faculty members at the institutions were between the
ages of 60 and 69 in 1996, and that this percentage was
likely to rise over the next 5 to 10 years. As retirements
increase in the years ahead, institutions will have the
opportunity to reconstitute their faculty. Institutions
that anticipate replacing a large fraction of their faculty
members may well worry about what the loss of so
much institution-specific “human capital” in a relatively
short time period will mean for their educational and
research programs. Many institutions will search for
ways to ameliorate these losses. Put simply, retirement
of faculty provides both benefits and costs to academic
institutions. Each institution needs to decide how it
should best address the process.
A 1998 TIAA-CREF Research Dialogue summarized the
results of several of the studies cited above, along with 
a number of other papers relating to mandatory retire-
ment.3 However, at the time that this Research Dialogue
was written, there was little systematic information
available regarding how institutions were altering their
retirement policies in response to the end of mandatory
retirement and how academic institutions treated
retired faculty members.
To fill these gaps in our knowledge, the Committee on
Retirement of the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP) conducted a Survey of Changes in
Faculty Retirement Policies at a large national sample of
colleges and universities during the spring and summer
of 2000. The survey was designed to obtain information
on several topics, including:
(1) the characteristics of regular retirement programs
for tenured faculty,
(2) the existence of retirement incentive and phased
retirement programs for tenured faculty members,
(3) institutional policies relating to the treatment of
retired faculty members, and
(4) institutions’ perceptions of the impact of the end of
mandatory retirement on their faculty members’
retirement behavior.
Financial support for the survey was provided by the
TIAA-CREF Institute. The American Council on Education,
the College and University Professional Association for
Human Resources, and the National Association of
College and University Business Officers cosponsored
the survey.
The survey’s results have been summarized in several
publications that were directed towards AAUP members
and the trustees of academic institutions and have also
been posted on the AAUP web site.4 The goal of this
Research Dialogue is to disseminate the survey results to a
wider audience, and to report some new findings on the
characteristics of institutions that reported in the survey
that a greater share of their senior faculty members are
now postponing retirement until after age 70.
<2> r e s e a r c h  d i a l o g u e
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T H E I R  R E G U L A R  R E T I R E M E N T
P R O G R A M S
The universe of institutions surveyed consisted of the
1,447 public and independent colleges and universities
with 75 or more full-time faculty in the United States.
The survey sought to obtain responses from 150 institu-
tions in each of three institutional categories: doctoral-,
masters-, and bachelors-granting colleges and universi-
ties. It also aimed for 75 responses from two-year
colleges with faculty ranks, and 75 responses from two-
year colleges without faculty ranks. Ultimately, 608 insti-
tutions responded to the survey.
An initial set of survey questions asked about the char-
acteristics of the institutions’ regular faculty retirement
plans. Defined contribution (“DC”) plans were by far the
most prevalent type of retirement programs at private
institutions. Under DC plans, the employer contributes 
a specified percentage of a faculty member’s salary each
year into a fund, which is then invested, in some cases
along with a required faculty member contribution, to
provide benefits for the faculty member in retirement.
The fund belongs to the faculty member, and as long as
the return on assets in the fund is positive, it increases
in value each year. As a result, DC pension plans do not
provide faculty members with strong economic incentives
that influence retirement decisions.
The plans at public institutions were more varied. Some
institutions had DC plans, some had state-sponsored
defined benefit plans, some offered faculty members a
choice of the two options, and some offered combinations
of the two types of plans. Defined benefit (“DB”) plans
provide retired faculty members with an annual retire-
ment benefit that usually depends upon their salary,
years of service, and often, age at retirement. When the
latter occurs, the adjustment in the annual pension
benefit paid when a faculty member retires early may
be, but is not necessarily, actuarially fair. DB plans can
offer incentives for retiring both by the way the annual
benefit adjustment for age is computed and because a
“normal” retirement age can be specified in the plan
after which there is no actuarial adjustment in the
annual benefit received. (Once one reaches this age, the
later one retires the fewer the number of years that the
benefits will be paid out.) In addition, these plans also
often specify maximum benefit percentages (as a share
of final salary), which after some point eliminate much
of the increase in annual benefits that comes from
working an extra year.
In a 1999 article, one of us (see Ronald G. Ehrenberg,
1999) pointed out that it is easy to build retirement
incentives into DB pension programs by offering 
individuals credit for additional years of service if they
retire before a specified age. The University of California
system did exactly that in several recent programs.
It is much more difficult and expensive, however, to
build effective retirement incentives into a DC pension
plan. One reason is that these typically take the form of
additional contributions made by employers to individuals’
retirement accounts, and such additional contributions
are subject to federal and state income taxes in the year
the contributions are made. At the same time, it is well
known that it is easier to create phased retirement
programs under DC systems, because phased retirements
can be structured in a way that does not reduce the
retirement benefits of faculty members who take
advantage of phased retirement.5 For example, an
employer can continue to make contributions into 
a faculty member’s retirement account that are based
upon the faculty member’s full-time salary, not the
partial salary that he or she is receiving for part-time
employment under the phased retirement agreement.
As such, it should not be surprising that we later report
that programs to encourage phased retirement are more
prevalent at private institutions, which are more likely
than public institutions to have defined contribution
plans.
Among the institutions with DC retirement plans, the
most typical institutional contribution rate is 10 percent
of a faculty member’s salary. However, a substantial
number of the institutions have contribution rates that
range between 5 and 9 percent, and a smaller number
contribute more than 10 percent. A number of the 
institutions with DC retirement plans have contribution
rates that vary across faculty members and that depend
upon a faculty member’s age, years of service, or salary.
Faculty members are not required to make contributions
to their retirement account at a number of the institu-
tions that have DC retirement plans. The required
faculty contribution rate varies widely across institu-
<4> r e s e a r c h  d i a l o g u e
tions that do require faculty contributions, with the
modal faculty contribution rate being 5 percent.
Among those institutions with DB retirement plans,
there is considerable variation in the increment in the
annual retirement benefit that a faculty member
receives per year of service. The typical DB plan provides
retiring faculty members with an annual retirement
benefit that is a multiple of their years of service times 
a measure of their “final” average salaries. For example,
if a faculty member had worked at the institution for 
30 years and the multiple (or “benefit-accrual rate”) was
2 percent, the faculty member would receive a retirement
benefit equal to 60 percent of his or her final average
salary. Often the final average salary is specified to be
the average of the faculty members’ last three or five,
or highest three or five, years’ salary. Under some plans,
if the faculty member retires prior to age 65, the annual
retirement benefit is actuarially reduced. Similarly, if the
faculty member chooses an option that guarantees a
spouse or other survivors continuation of some fraction
of the annual benefit when the faculty member dies,
the annual benefit paid out is similarly reduced.
The annual retirement benefit per year of service offered
by surveyed institutions’ DB plans varies between 1.0
and 2.5 percent of final average salary per year of service,
with the most frequent multiple being 2.0 percent. For
about one-third of the institutions that provided us
with information on the nature of their DB system, the
generosity of the system cannot be easily summarized
in a single number. In many of these cases, the multiple
varies with final average salary or with the date of hire.
For example, the generosity of the DB retirement system
in which State University of New York faculty members
may choose to enroll differs across a number of “tiers.”
The tier in which a faculty member is placed depends
upon his or her hire date.
Almost half of the institutions with DB plans have limits
on the maximum retirement benefit that a faculty
member may receive. In about a third of the institutions
with limits, the limit is based upon the number of years
of service at the institution that faculty members can
get credit for in the computation of their annual
pension benefits. The modal limit is 40 years; however,
institutions report limits that vary between 25 and 50
years, with their responses being concentrated in the
30- to 40-year range. In slightly over half of the institu-
tions that report limits, the limit is specified as a cap on
the percentage of the faculty member’s annual salary
that may be received in the form of an annual pension
benefit. In most of these cases, the limit falls in the 65
percent to 100 percent range.
In addition to providing a retirement benefit program,
over 80 percent of the respondents to the survey indicate
that their institution offers seminars, or other programs
to encourage and/or assist their faculty in planning for
retirement. Two-year colleges are less likely to provide
such programs than their bachelors-granting, masters-
granting and doctoral-granting counterparts.
> > > R E T I R E M E N T  I N C E N T I V E
P R O G R A M S
As the top panel of Table 1 indicates, slightly less than
half of the respondents to the survey, 46.2 percent,
reported that their institutions have had one or more
financial incentive programs since 1995 that encouraged
tenured faculty members to retire prior to age 70. These
incentive programs often take the form of increments to
annual retirement benefits or lump sum cash payments.
The California programs described above are examples
of programs that increased annual retirement benefits.
Retirement incentive programs were most likely to be
reported at institutions in the “public 2-year with faculty
ranks” category; 67 percent of these institutions reported
having such a program. Among the 4-year institutions,
private institutions were more likely to have such programs
than public institutions. Doctoral-granting institutions
were more likely to have such programs than masters-
granting institutions, which in turn were about as likely
to have such programs as bachelors-granting institutions.
Among the private doctoral institutions, 60 percent
reported having had a retirement incentive program.
The bottom panel of Table 1 indicates that slightly 
more than one-third of the institutions (34.6 percent)
reported that their financial incentive programs
provided for negotiated buyouts (cash payments), or
other special arrangements, on a college-by-college or
case-by-case basis. Buyouts were again more prevalent
among private than public institutions. Doctoral-grant-
ing institutions were more likely to have such programs
i s s u e  n o . 6 9 o c t o b e r  2 0 0 1 <5>
than masters-granting institutions, which in turn were
more likely to have them than bachelors-granting insti-
tutions. At the doctoral institution level, 72 percent of
the private institutions, but only 38 percent of the public
institutions, reported such arrangements.
In slightly over half of the cases in which buyouts were
made available, all tenured faculty members were auto-
matically eligible to take advantage of the buyout if
they met the institution’s age and/or years of service
and/or age plus years of service requirement for eligibility.
At the remaining institutions, approval by department
chairs, deans and/or central administrators was required
to ensure that a buyout made sense from the perspective
of a faculty member’s department and college. Similarly,
in slightly over half of the cases in which buyouts were
available, they were offered on an ongoing basis, while
in the remaining cases eligibility for the special buyout
only took place if a faculty member made a commitment
to retire within a specified time period (or “window”).
Among those institutions with more than one buyout
plan since 1995, the plans prior to the current one
tended to be window plans. A reasonable conjecture 
is that once a window plan is adopted and then expires,
faculty believe that future window plans will be
adopted and threaten to delay their retirements until a
subsequent plan is adopted.6 This puts pressure on 
institutions to adopt a subsequent plan if they want to
encourage their older faculty members to retire. Given
this behavior, it may make sense for institutions to focus
on the long-run implications of the end of mandatory
retirement for their faculty demographics and adopt
ongoing plans in the future.
T a b l e  1 : U s e  o f  F i n a n c i a l  R e t i r e m e n t I n c e n t i v e s  a t R e s p o n d i n g  I n s t i t u t i o n s
type of incentive Institutional Category Private Public Total
Percentage with
Financial Incentive(s)
for Early Retirement
(before age 70) Since
1995
Percentage with 
“Buyouts” Since 1995
Note: Two institutions did not respond to the question in the top panel; 13 institutions did not respond in the bottom panel.
(Number of responses received in parentheses)
I (Doctoral) 60% (25) 42% (97) 46% (122)
IIA (Masters) 42% (69) 41% (114) 41% (183)
IIB (Baccalaureate) 45% (115) 37% (38) 43% (153)
III (2 yr. w/Faculty Ranks) 0% (1) 67% (70) 66% (71)
IV (2 yr. w/o Faculty Ranks) 0% (4) 44% (73) 42% (77)
OVERALL 46% (214) 46% (392) 46.2% (606)
I (Doctoral) 72% (25) 38% (95) 45% (120)
IIA (Masters) 57% (68) 18% (113) 33% (181)
IIB (Baccalaureate) 49% (113) 17% (36) 41% (149)
III (2 yr. w/Faculty Ranks) 0% (1) 32% (69) 31% (70)
IV (2 yr. w/o Faculty Ranks) 0% (4) 13% (71) 12% (75)
OVERALL 53% (211) 24% (384) 34.6% (595)
The survey asked respondents about the size of cash
payments that they offered to faculty members to
encourage them to retire. Of those institutions offering
lump sum payments, 55 percent offered less than
9 months salary, 28 percent offered 9 to 18 months
salary, and only 16 percent offered payments equivalent
to more than 18 months salary. In a relatively small
number of cases, the magnitude of the payment
declined with the age at which the faculty member
retired. That is, in those plans larger payments were
given to faculty who retired at younger ages. The relatively
small proportion of plans in which the generosity of the
buyout declines with the age of retirement may reflect
the legal uncertainty associated with such plans until
the passage of the Higher Education Act Amendments
of 1998. This uncertainty had arisen because it was
unclear before then whether having buyouts in which
the generosity varied with a faculty member’s age at
retirement would violate the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.
At about 90 institutions, the financial incentive to retire
took the form of an increase in the faculty member’s
annual retirement benefit, rather than a one-time cash
payment. As noted above, under current tax laws, in
most cases additional employer contributions to
enhance DC pensions are treated as cash payments and
therefore subject to federal income tax in the year that
they are made. As a result, financial incentives in the
form of increments in retirement benefits will be
adopted primarily when the institution’s retirement
plan is of the DB type. Often these increments take the
form of crediting the faculty member with a specified
number of months of additional service credit towards
retirement for each year that he or she was actually
employed at the institution. For example, in New York
State, one recent retirement incentive program provided
SUNY faculty members with one month’s additional
service credit for each year they had been employed, up
to a maximum of 36 months (three years) of additional 
service credit.
In a small number of cases (15 in total) the financial
incentive for retirement took the form of provision of 
a terminal leave. From the perspective of faculty
members, the advantage of a terminal leave over a cash
payment is that employee benefits, such as health insur-
ance and pension accruals, often continue while a
faculty member is on terminal leave. For example, if the
leave were a year long under a DB system, the faculty
member would get credit for an additional year of service
towards retirement. Under a DC system, the faculty
member would receive an additional year’s contributions
to his or her retirement account. In 60 percent of the
cases when terminal leaves were present, they were
nine months or less; the leave was more than 18 months
at only one institution.
> > > P H A S E D  R E T I R E M E N T
P R O G R A M S
Some faculty members find the prospect of abruptly
ending their academic careers very distasteful, and this
is likely to induce them to postpone retirement. Two
ways that transitions into retirement can be made more
gradual for faculty are to permit faculty to phase into
retirement by working part-time for a specified number
of years before they retire, or to permit them to teach
part-time after they have formally retired.
As Table 2 indicates, only 27 percent of the institutions
that responded to our survey have formal programs that
permit tenured faculty members to gradually transition
into retirement by working part-time for a number of
years before they retire. In almost two-thirds of the
cases where such programs exist, administrative
approval is required for an individual to take advantage
of the program, while in the remaining cases all faculty
members who meet the eligibility criteria are automati-
cally eligible to take advantage of the program.
Institutions with DC retirement systems are twice as
likely as institutions with DB retirement systems to have
such programs. As noted above, this finding was
expected, because an individual’s annual benefit level
under a DB pension system is typically based upon some
average of his or her earnings during the individual’s
years of highest earnings. Working part-time for a few
years before retirement may substantially reduce the
annual DB pension benefit. This is because salary increases
received during the last few years of employment will 
typically not raise the faculty member’s part-time salary
above his or her previous full-time salary. Hence, choosing
to receive a part-time salary just before retirement may
serve to lower the measure of average salary that is used
in calculating the DB retirement benefit.
<6> r e s e a r c h  d i a l o g u e
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In contrast, annual pension benefits received under a 
DC system are based upon the lifetime of contributions
made to the faculty member’s retirement account and
the rate of return on these contributions over time.
Contributions made near the end of an individual’s
career will have a relatively small effect on the individual’s
annual retirement benefit. Moreover, as we shall see
shortly, institutions with DC pensions and phased retire-
ment arrangements often continue to make payments
to the individual’s retirement account based upon the
individual’s full-time salary. Thus, phased retirement
programs under DC retirement systems often result in
no reduction in the faculty member’s annual retirement
benefit relative to what the faculty member would have
received if he or she had continued to work full-time for
the same number of years.
About 75 percent of the institutions that have formal
phased retirement programs have established minimum
ages that faculty members must attain to be eligible to
participate in the program. The most common minimum
age for eligibility is 55. Similarly, three quarters of these
programs also require that a faculty member must have
been employed at the institution for a specified number
of years. The majority of these require at least 10 years
of service, with significant numbers of the programs
also requiring 15 and 20 years of service.
Almost a quarter of the institutions that have such
programs (35 institutions in the survey) also specify a
maximum age that a faculty member may attain and
still remain eligible to participate in the program. The
most common ages specified here are 65 and 70. Placing
a cap on the age at which a faculty member is eligible to
participate in the phased retirement program provides
an incentive for faculty members who are near that age
to seriously think about whether they want to take
advantage of the program and begin the process leading
to retirement. Cornell University has a maximum age for
eligibility of 70 in its phased retirement program for
exactly this reason.
Faculty members who enter into phased retirement
programs often receive special financial benefits. Over
80 percent of the programs provide for the college or
university to continue to make full employer contribu-
tions toward the faculty member’s health insurance
plan. About 20 percent of the programs provide addi-
tional retirement payments or credits. For faculty working
under DC systems, this typically takes the form of the
institutions making contributions to the individual’s
retirement account based on more than his or her pro
rata salary. For faculty working under DB systems, this
typically takes the form of receiving a full year’s service
credit towards retirement even though the faculty
member is working only part-time.7 Finally, over 35
percent of the institutions with such programs provide
program participants with additional salary payments. For
example, a faculty member who reduces to half-time
status might receive salary payments equal to 60
percent of his or her annual salary.
Faculty members who enroll in such plans typically
must agree to relinquish their tenure at a specified
point, and formally agree to retire within a specified
number of years. Nineteen institutions, representing 
16.5 percent of the institutions with such plans, allow
tenured faculty members to remain in part-time status
for as long as they want. Most other institutions with
phased retirement programs specify a maximum
number of years that individuals can remain in this
part-time status before relinquishing tenure; typically
this is specified to be 3 to 5 years.
T a b l e  2 : P e r c e n t a g e  o f  I n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  E a c h
C a t e g o r y  t h a t C u r r e n t l y  H a v e  a  F o r m a l  P h a s e d
R e t i r e m e n t P r o g r a m
Institutional Category Private Public Total
Note: One institution did not respond to this question.
(Number of responses received in parentheses)
I (Doctoral) 50% (26) 31% (97) 35% (123)
IIA (Masters) 33% (69) 23% (115) 29% (184)
IIB (Baccalaureate) 31% (114) 24% (38) 29% (152)
III (2 yr. w/Faculty Ranks) 0% (1) 14% (70) 14% (71)
IV (2 yr. w/o Faculty Ranks) 0% (4) 19% (73) 18% (77)
OVERALL 35% (214) 23% (393) 27% (607)
> > > H E A LT H  I N S U R A N C E  A N D
T R E A T M E N T  O F  R E T I R E D
F A C U LT Y  M E M B E R S
Health insurance is very important to retirees. About
80 percent of the respondents indicated that their insti-
tution provided continued eligibility to retirees for group
health insurance. However, only 58 percent of the insti-
tutions contributed to the cost of retirees’health insurance.
The failure of institutions to contribute to retiree health
insurance costs may provide an incentive for faculty
members to delay their retirements. Institutions
concerned about retirement rates among older faculty
members might consider whether the benefits of being
able to hire new faculty at more rapid rates would offset
the costs of providing retiree health insurance.
Some faculty members approaching ages when they
might consider retirement worry about “being put out
to pasture” and about retirement meaning the end of
their professional careers. Thus, actions that colleges
and universities take to assure their faculty members
that they value retired faculty and do not view retirement
as the end of the faculty members’ careers may influence
their tenured faculty members’ willingness to retire. As
such, the survey also asked the institutions questions
about their treatment of retired faculty members.
Many faculty members contemplating retirement would
like to be able to continue to teach on a part-time basis
after they retire.8 Virtually all the institutions permit
their retired faculty to teach on a part-time basis,
although in about half of the cases, the institutions 
indicated that only some retired faculty were permitted
to teach. In about 30 percent of the institutions, tenured
faculty may formally negotiate continued part-time
teaching as a condition for their retirement. For example,
under a program that currently exists in the University
of North Carolina system, faculty members can negotiate
an arrangement in which they formally retire and start
drawing retirement benefits from the state retirement
system, while simultaneously being rehired to teach for
a fixed number of years to teach part-time.9 About half
of public and private doctoral institutions engage in
such negotiations with their faculty members. Retired
faculty members teaching part-time are paid similarly
to other part-time faculty in about 73 percent of the
institutions, while in 21 percent they are paid more. In 
a small fraction of cases, they are paid less than other
part-time faculty.
In almost 85 percent of the institutions, faculty members
who retire are eligible to have the title emeritus professor
conferred upon them. In about half of these institutions
it is fairly routine for all retiring tenured faculty to have
the title conferred upon them, while in the remaining
half the title is subject to the discretion of the university
administration.
About 35 percent of the institutions allow their retired
faculty to continue to advise or supervise students’
honors thesis or dissertations, and another 12 percent
allow retirees to chair pertinent committees. These
percentages are much higher at doctoral institutions.
The survey also obtained information about a set of
benefits that many faculty members may feel are
important to have if they want to continue their profes-
sional involvement once they have retired. Slightly less
than half of institutions indicated that they provided
office space to retirees, although the vast majority of
doctoral institutions indicated that they did. Two-thirds
of the institutions indicated that they provided retirees
with access to institutional computer systems and parking,
while about two-fifths indicated that they provided
retirees with access to telephones. However, only
11 percent of all the institutions, including only slightly
more than 20 percent of the doctoral institutions,
provided their retired faculty with any funds for 
professional travel.
Access to laboratory space is of particular concern to
active research scientists who are contemplating retire-
ment. Only 11 percent of the institutions indicated that
they assign lab space to retired professors who are
scientists using the same criteria that are used for
tenured faculty members (such as volume of sponsored
research grants generated over a specified number of
years). In the doctoral institutions, where scientists
contemplating retirement are much more likely to be
concerned about their access to laboratory space, this
percentage is much higher, but it is still less than half.
The vast majority of doctoral institutions allow their
retired faculty members to continue to submit external
research grants through the institutions; other types of
colleges and universities are less likely to allow their
retired faculty to do so.
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> > > T H E  E N D  O F  M A N D A T O R Y
R E T I R E M E N T
The federal law mandating the end of mandatory 
retirement was passed in 1987, even though it did 
not become effective for tenured faculty members at
academic institutions until 1994. Only 27 percent of the
institutions in the sample reported that mandatory
retirement of tenured faculty ceased at their institution
as late as 1994. Another 29 percent reported that it
ceased between 1987 and 1994; these institutions acted
to end mandatory retirement before they were required
to by the change in the law. The remaining 44 percent of
institutions in the sample ceased to have mandatory
retirement for faculty prior to 1987. These are institu-
tions in states in which state laws prohibited mandatory
retirement at an earlier date, or institutions that had
never had, or had decided at an earlier date, to eliminate
mandatory retirement.
The survey asked each institution if the fraction of its
tenured faculty members that continued in full-time
employment after age 69 was greater in recent years
than it was prior to the institution’s having eliminated
mandatory retirement. As Table 3 indicates, only 22
percent of the 420 institutions that responded to this
question indicated that it was. Most respondents do not
believe that the abolition of mandatory retirement has
caused more tenured faculty members to remain in
their positions at their institution beyond age 69.
However, the responses to this question varied widely
across institutional types. Doctoral-granting institutions
were more likely to report that a greater proportion of
faculty were staying on beyond age 70 than were
masters-granting institutions, which in turn were more
likely to report this than bachelors-granting institutions.
Within each of these categories, private institutions
were more likely to report this than were public institu-
tions. Hence, consistent with the earlier research, it is
the doctoral institutions that need to worry the most
about the end of mandatory retirement leading to a
postponement in the ages at which some of their
faculty members retire, which in turn will increase their
faculty salary bills and slow down their rates of new
faculty hiring.
To probe deeper into the characteristics of the institutions
that reported a greater proportion of their faculty staying
on beyond age 70, we conducted a multivariate regression
analysis. In the analysis, we estimated the relationship
between whether an institution reported a greater
proportion of its faculty staying on beyond age 70 and
several factors of interest. We included the following
variables in the regression model: (1) whether the insti-
tution reported having a retirement incentive program;
(2) whether it reported having a phased retirement
program; (3) whether it contributed to faculty retirees’
health insurance; (4) the type of institution (doctoral,
masters, bachelors, two-year); (5) its type of retirement
program (DC, DB, choice of DC or DB, both); and (6) its
endowment per full-time student. We estimated 
separate equations for the private and public institutions
in our sample.
It is important to note that the relationships we estimated
should not be interpreted as behavioral relationships,
because potential simultaneity problems exist. For
example, an increased proportion of faculty staying 
on beyond age 70 may cause an institution to create a
phased retirement program. At the same time, the exis-
tence of a phased retirement program may influence
the proportion of faculty who stay on beyond age 70.
The relationship that we observe is therefore the net
effect of these two causal relationships. Thus, readers
should view the findings that follow as descriptive only.
With this caveat in mind, we found the following:
T a b l e  3 : P e r c e n t a g e  R e p o r t i n g  I n c r e a s e  i n  A g e
6 9 +  F a c u l t y  M e m b e r s  F o l l o w i n g  E l i m i n a t i o n  o f
M a n d a t o r y  R e t i r e m e n t
Institutional Category Private Public Total
I (Doctoral) 53% (17) 42% (74) 44% (91)
IIA (Masters) 23% (48) 13% (82) 17% (130)
IIB (Baccalaureate) 15% (86) 6% (31) 13% (117)
III (2 yr. w/Faculty Ranks) 26% (42) 26% (42)
IV (2 yr. w/o Faculty Ranks) 0% (2) 8% (38) 8% (40)
OVERALL 22% (153) 22% (267) 22% (420)
Note: 188 institutions did not respond to this question.
(Number of responses received in parentheses)
(1) As the two-way tabulations presented in Table 3 and
the articles previously cited suggest, in both the
public and private sectors, the proportion of faculty
staying on beyond age 70 was most likely to have
increased at doctoral institutions.
(2) At private institutions, the only other variable that
appeared to be associated with a change in the
proportion of faculty staying on beyond age 70 was
the institution’s endowment per faculty member.
Higher endowments per faculty member were corre-
lated, other factors held constant, with an increased
proportion of faculty staying on past age 70. This
result is not surprising, because the academic insti-
tutions with higher endowments per student tend
to be the most selective in term of their student
bodies, have the highest faculty salaries, have the
lowest teaching loads and provide the most
research support to faculty. In short, they are places
where faculty members are very happy with their
work environment.
(3) For public institutions, those that made contributions
to retired faculty members’ health insurance and/or
have a phased retirement program, other variables
held constant, were more likely to have answered
that an increasing share of their faculty are now
staying on beyond age 70. The signs of these rela-
tionships suggest that the direction of causation
runs primarily from an increasing proportion of
faculty staying on beyond age 70 to the establishment
of a phased retirement program or to the institution’s
contributing to retirees’ health insurance rather
than vice versa.
One might also hypothesize that the generosity of an
academic institution’s retirement plan (as measured
either by the employer contribution rate in a DC plan,
or the generosity of a DB plan’s benefit multiple per year
of service) might influence whether faculty members
increasingly stayed on beyond age 70 after mandatory
retirement was abolished. However, when we added the
employer contribution rate under the institution’s DC
plan to the private institution equation and the
generosity of the DB plan (for those public institutions
for which we had such information) to the public institu-
tion equation, we found no evidence that either variable
significantly influenced the increase in the proportion of
faculty staying on beyond age 70.
> > > C O N C L U D I N G  R E M A R K S
The findings we report above have implications for both
institutions and their faculty members. In some states,
rapidly growing college age cohorts will require academic
institutions to hire large numbers of new faculty in the
years ahead to fill positions created to meet the expanding
demand for enrollments. Nationally, institutions will
have to replace a large number of retiring faculty members
in the years ahead. This suggests that most institutions’
concern in upcoming years will not be how to encourage
their faculty members to retire. Rather, their concern will
be how to continue to draw on the skills of faculty nearing
retirement ages to provide stability to their institutions
during a time of rapid change.
In the years ahead, it is likely that more and more insti-
tutions will consider developing programs to permit
phased retirements, or to encourage retired faculty to
teach part-time, as a way of meeting their teaching
needs. Similarly, faculty groups at institutions may well
want to contrast the regular retirement programs,
retirement incentive programs, and programs relating 
to emeritus faculty that their institutions offer with the
programs that we indicate are being offered at other
institutions and use this information in discussion with
their administrations.
To facilitate both administrative and faculty groups
making use of the survey data, the AAUP web site
(www.aaup.org) contains some additional tabulations.
It also contains web addresses for sites that contain the
details of institutions’ faculty retirement related
programs for about 40 percent of the institutions that
responded to the survey. Readers interested in informa-
tion about the details of the programs at any of these
institutions can directly download that information
from the appropriate web sites. Finally, approximately 
50 percent of the institutions that responded to the
survey indicated that they were willing to have their
responses shared with others and these institutions
names are also listed on the AAUP web site. Information
is also found there about whom at the AAUP to contact
to obtain special tabulations for any subset of these
institutions.
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